Uniwersytet Cambridge nie poddał się naciskom bankowców

Wyjasnic mozna jako ciekawostke, ze wymieniona w artykule praca dyplomowa jest na stopien Master of Philosophy (M.Phil.), ktory nie ma u nas odpowiednika. Jest to podyplomowy stopien pomiedzy MSc (mgr) a PhD (dr), na ktory trzeba sobie zapracowac studiujac i prowadzac badania naukowe zazwyczaj przez 2 lata, a jako, ze w 3 lata mozna zrobic PhD, wiec najczesciej wiekszosc osob wybiera stduia doktoranckie (PhD), ale jesli z jakis powodow nie uda sie zebrac materialu na PhD wowczas mozna "zdegradowac" sie i zamiast tego zlozyc prace na MPhil, czesto (np. z powodow finansowych) jest tez tak, ze najpierw wybiera sie studiowanie na stopien Mphil, a pozniej, po jakims czasie mozna sie przerejstrowac na studiowanie na PhD i czas (badania) jakie pierwotnie poswiecono na studiowanie na stopien Mphil bedzie wliczony do pracy doktorskiej (PhD).

Akurat jednak o Camrbridge wikipedia podaje: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Master_of_Philosophy
ze uczelnia ta ma programy studiow Mphil w ktorych nawet w 9-12 miesiecy mozna otrzymac ten stopien.

Na stronie w/w profesora mozna zobaczyc inny ciekawy temat -plan zastapienia 47 milionow licznikow gazu i elektrycznosci na takie, ktore mozna zdalnie wylaczyc:

"Who controls the off switch? describes the strategic vulnerability created by the plan to replace 47m gas and electricity meters with ‘smart meters’ that can be switched off remotely. On the security economics of electricity metering looks more broadly at what's likely to go wrong with smart metering projects; it appeared at WEIS 2010 (coverage on CNET and Ecoseed). Finally, Key Management for Substations: Symmetric Keys, Public Keys or No Keys? debunks the proposal to mandate public-key crypto in electricity substations."
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/

Ciekawe jak by to (test tej metody w sklepie) wygladalo z punktu widzenia naszego prawa:

Fifth, you say ‘Concern was expressed to us by the police that the student was allowed to falsify a transaction in a shop in Cambridge without first warning the merchant’. I fail to understand the basis for this. The banks in France had claimed (as you did) that their systems were secure; a French TV programme wished to discredit this claim (as Newsnight discredited yours); and I understand that Omar did a No-PIN transaction on the card of a French journalist with the journalist’s consent and on camera.
At no time was there any intent to commit fraud; the journalist’s account was debited in due course in accordance with his mandate and the merchant was paid. It is perfectly clear that no transaction was falsified in any material sense. I would not consider such an experiment to require a reference to our ethics committee. By that time the Newsnight programme had appeared and the No-PIN attack was entirely in the public domain. The French television programme was clearly in the public interest, as it made it more difficult for banks in France to defraud their customers by claiming that their systems were secure when they were not.

Ten komentarz uscisla pare rzeczy w jezyku polskim:

http://forum.gazeta.pl/forum/w,30,120331560,120356738,Kolejny_skretynialy_pismak_i_nie_lepsze_forum_.html

aczkolwiek podaje niescisla date i tworcow odkrycia luki, bo z wymienionego w artykule listu w/w profesora wynika, ze on wraz z dwoma wspolautorami odkryli, opisali i opublikowali te luke juz w 2009 r.

Trochę informacji technicznych tutaj: Karty kredytowe z chipem podatne na atak.